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SOME NOTES ON THE UTILIZATION OF PRIVATE
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
FARM PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS, 1933-1953
lbmD L. FRISCHKNZCHT*
I.
The delegation of public authority to private groups has not been
an uncommon occurrence. Such typical delegations include: (1)
statutes or ordinances declaring a specific act a criminal offense un-
less the actor secures in advance the consent of a named group;1
(2) utilization of interested groups in the enforcement of the criminal
law ;2 (3) and executive appointment of persons to public office from
recommendations by private organizations. 3  More common delega-
tions include the statutory infliction of penalties for the violation of
rules promulgated by non-official groups, or the statutory granting
of professional licenses providing that the applicant conform with or
meet rules and standards developed by private or unofficial groups;
the right to practice medicine or law being typical examples.
4
One student of government, writing in 1932, observed that such
delegations are motivated "by a recognition that the central organs
of government, presumably competent to operate in fields when the
interests of all the people are common, are sometimes palpably in-
competent to deal with problems affecting specialized units."5 Louis
L. Jaffe argued that the "legislature may legitimately consider that
public administration in some cases is inadequate acting alone and
in others a positive and unnecessary embarrassment.
' 6
At the same time, however, others have not only urged that ex-
treme caution be exercised in delegating the execution of public
functions to private groups but contended that on the face such
delegation is undesirable. While of the opinion that such delegation
could serve a useful public purpose, another student concluded that
*University of Utah. Acknowledgment is made to the Research Committee of the
University of Utah for assistance in the preparation of this study.
1. City of Spokane v. Camp, 50 Wash. 554, 97 Pac. 770 (1908).
2. Fox v. Mohawk and H. R. Humane Soc., 165 N.Y. 517, 527, 529, 59 N.E.
353 (1901).
3. Parke v. Bradley, 204 Ala. 455, 86 So. 28 (1920).
4. N.Y. PnNiAL LAW (McKINNZY 1917) 22440; MASs. LAW 1818, c. 113;
CAL. LAwS 1901, 56, repealed, CAL. LANws 1921, 1051.
5. Anon., Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Groups, 32 COL. L.
Rrv. 80 (1932).
6. Jaffe, Law Making By Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. Rv. 253 (1937).
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"it seems desirable to attempt to chart the permissible limits of this
type of delegation. ' 7 Several years later, Avery Leiserson strongly
voiced the opinion that "in the prevailing current of thought in
public administration the explicit endowment of private group repre-
sentatives, responsible to private constituencies, with official respon-
sibility as prima facie suspect."
During the period, when Jaffe, Leiserson, and others were debat-
ing the desirability of delegating public authority of a regulatory
nature to private groups, the United States Department of Agricul-
ture was embarking upon an experimentation involving the utiliza-
tion of private organizations in the administration of its agricultural
price-support programs. The present study hopes to make a modest
contribution to this general problem by reporting the experience
of the Commodity Credit Corporation and the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration, and its successors,9 in this undertaking.
In the main, the utilization of private organizations has been moti-
vated by a recognition that these agencies of the United States
Department of Agriculture are not adequately organized or qualified
to deal with specialized and peculiar problems connected with the
extension of price-support to farmers. During the years since 1933,
such programs have been put into effect on a large scale; over forty-
five federal statutory provisions reveal government's attempt to aid
agricultural producers.' 0 Private organizations, although not gener-
ally recognized and understood by the public, have played a major
role in this effort. The question to be answered, therefore, is whether
their utilization is desirable public policy or whether it is more
compatible with the public interest to always require that public
agricultural programs be exclusively administered by agencies of the
United States Department of Agriculture. To a description of their
activities we now turn.
7. Anon., Delegation of Power to Private Parties, 37 CoL. L. REv. 446 (1937).
8. Leiserson, ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 12 (1942). He went on to add:
"The overwhelming trend of opinion favors the elimination of explicit interest
representation in all forms by that of advice." Cf. Jaffe loc. cit., p. 220: "Par-
ticipation in law-making by private groups under explicit statutory 'delegation'
does not stand . . . in absolute contradiction to the traditional processes and
conditions of law-making, it is not incompatible with the conception of law."
9. The Agricultural Adjustment Agency, 1942-1945; the Production and Mar-
keting Administration, 1945-1953; and the Commodity Stabilization Service,
1953, to the present.
10. For a description and evaluation of the administrative devices and respec-
tive programs relied upon to support agricultural prices and incomes, see Reed
L. Frischknecht, Farm Price and Income Support Programs, 1933-1950, Re-
search Monograph Series No. 1 (Salt Lake City: Institute of Government,
University of Utah, 1953), pp. 1-80.
[Vol. 7
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II.
Nonrecourse commodity loans for the purpose of stabilizing agri-
cultural prices were made prior to the establishment of the Commodi-
ty Credit Corporation through facilities of the Federal Farm Board
created by the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929.11 However,
only since the establishment of the Commodity Credit Corporation in
October, 1933, have such loans been made as a part of a general
program to support farm prices.
12
The Corporation has extensively utilized private lending agencies
to make the actual nonrecourse commodity loans to eligible farmers.
These lending agencies, some 9,000 in number, at present consist
mostly of private local banks, although commodity dealers and pro-
ducer co-operative associations are also utilized.' 3 Their use by
the Secretary of Agriculture has been authorized by every major
piece of price-support legislation enacted since 1933.14
As an administrative device, private lending agencies have en-
abled the Commodity Credit Corporation, at the Secretary's direc-
tion, to make price-support readily available to producers and, at
the same time, to utilize to a large extent local lending facilities and
the normal channels of trade. At the present time, the Commodity
Stabilization Service's Regional Commodity Offices are responsible
for the certification of lending agencies, which must execute a
formal loan servicing agreement before being certified to make com-
modity loans to farmers.
The procedure in obtaining a loan is roughly as follows: Appli-
cants for both farm and warehouse storage commodity loans must
apply at the office of the County Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation CommitteeI5 in which the Agricultural Conservation
11. Pub. L. No. 10, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (June 15, 1929).
12. For a detailed description and history of the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion, its operation and relationships with the Agricultural Adjustment Adminis-
tration, and its successors, see Reed L. Frischknecht, The Commodity Credit
Corporation: A Case Study of a Government Corporation, 6 THE WlsTERN
PoLITIcAL QUARTERLY 559-569 (1953).
13. Warehousing Practices, Commodity Credit Corporation, Department of
Agriculture, Hearings before the Sub-committee on Agriculture of the House
Committee on Appropriations, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. Jan. 16, 1952 (Washing-
ton, 1952), p. 3.
14. See Pub. L. No. 10, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (June 15, 1929); Pub. L. No.
461, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (February 29, 1936); Pub. L. No. 430, 75th Cong.,
3rd Sess. (February 16, 1938); Pub. L. No. 806, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (June
29, 1948) ; Pub. L. No. 85, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (June 7, 1949); and Pub. L.
No. 897, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 3, 1948).
15. For a detailed description and analysis of the "farmer committee system,"
see Reed L. Frischknecht, The Democratization of Administration; The Farm-
er Committee System, 47 THE AMsRICAN PouTicAL Sci:-NcE Ravv-w 704-727
(1953).
1954]
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Program records are maintained for the farm on which the product
was produced. 16 A determination of eligibility for price-support of
both the producer and the commodity offered as collateral for the
loan is then made. An eligible producer is one who has complied
with his acreage allotment and marketing quota if such allotments
and quotas are in effect. 17 Commodity eligibility is generally limited
to the qualities usually handled under normal trade practices, the
lower grades generally being ineligible for price-support.' 8 In the
case of farm storage loans, the commodity must have been stored on
the farm at least thirty days prior to its inspection, measuring, sam-
pling, and sealing by a representative of the County Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Committee. Producers pay a small
service fee of not less than $3.00 depending upon the quantity placed
under loan.' 9 This procedure is not necessary, however, in the case
of warehouse storage loans since the warehouse receipt issued to
the farmer shows this information as to quantity and quality.2 0 The
County Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Committee or its
representative, generally the "County Office Manager," next prepares
and approves a producer's note, along with a chattel mortgage irk
the case of farm storage loans, which is then delivered to the private
lending agency, generally the farmer's local bank, along with ware-
house receipts and supporting documents in the amount specified
in the producer's note.
2 1
16. Commodity Stabilization Service and Commodity Credit Corporation,
Commodity Loan and Purchase Handbook, Part II (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1949), pp. 4 and 17.
17. At certain times in the past, other requirements have included compliance
with soil conservation practices, wartime production goals and marketing agree-
ments and orders.
18. For example, in the case of loans on the 1950 crop of dry edible beans,
the beans had to meet the following requirements: "The beans must be dry
edible beans of the classes pea, medium, white, Great Northern, small white,
flat small white, small red pinto, cranberry, red kidney, large lima and baby
lima. Beans placed under loan must be (1) grade No. 2 or better, or (2) be
beans not commercially cleaned which have a moisture content of not more than
18 per cent and which, after deduction of foreign material, contains not more-
than 10 per cent of other defects as these terms are defined in the U. S. Stan-
dards for Beans .... Beans tendered for loan must not be musty, sour, heating-
hot, weevily, or materially weathered; must not have any commercially objec-
tionable odor; and must not otherwise be of distinctly low quality." See Produc-
tion and Marketing Administration and Commodity Credit Corporation, 1950'
Crop Dry Edible Beans Price Support Program (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1950), p. 1.
19. See Production Marketing Administration and Commodity Credit Cor-
poration, General Provisions 1950 Crop Price Support Programs for Grains alld
Related Commodities (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 1.
20. Commodity Stabilization Service and Commodity Credit Corporation,
Commodity Loan and Purchase Handbook, Part II, p. 17.
21. Ibid., pp. 13, 20-22.
[Vol. 7
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The majority of loans are made by private lending agencies.
However, farmers may obtain a loan directly from the Commodi-
ty Credit Corporation by applying to the County Agricultural Stabi-
lization and Conservation Committee office, followed by actual dis-
bursement by the State Agricultural Stabilization and Conserva-
tion Committee office. If the loan is privately made, the Commodity
Credit Corporation stands ready at all times to purchase the pro-
ducer's note, at face value plus accrued interest, upon the demand
of the lending agency. In 1947, Mr. N. E. Dodd, the Under Secre-
tary of Agriculture and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors
of the CCC, testifying before the Senate Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry stated:
I would like to make it clear to the committee, [that] we require
a good deal of money or borrowing power at the time you set
up these loans.
Now, not that you use the money. It may be that you will never
use any of the money if the loans turn out all right. But before
we can go out and say that we will make a wheat loan or a
corn loan or a cotton loan, you are required to have- and we
do set it aside on the books-as a commitment against that
much money .... That requires a substantial sum of money
to underwrite those loans .... The county banks are the ones
that make the loans. All we do is underwrite paper.
2 2
Lending agencies which finance and service price support loans
will receive from farmers, effective with the 1954 program an interest
rate of 13/4 per cent per annum and a fee of 2 per cent per annum
for service.28 This will return to lending agencies a total rate of
compensation of 24 per cent per annum, as compared to 3 per cent
per year now in effect on 1953 crop loans.2 4 This reduction is in
line with the recent trend of interest rates on short-term government
and commercial borrowings. The Commodity Credit Corporation,
therefore, performs primarily an underwriting function in price sup-
port operations, with local private financial concerns by and large
providing the actual funds for price support.
22. To Continue the Commodity Credit Corporation, Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 350,
February 24, 1947 (Washington, 1947), p. 6. See also Pub. L. No. 806, 80th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (June 29, 1948).
23. For a resume of these services see Commodity Credit Corporation Char-
ter, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 80th
Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 1322, January 19, 1948 (Washington, 1948), pp. 85-86.
24. United States Department of Agriculture, USDA Reduces Payment Rate
to Agencies Financing CCC Loans for 1954 Programs. (Washington: Mimeo-
graphed, April 23, 1954), p. 1.
1954]
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In addition, the Commodity Credit Corporation has utilized pro-
ducer co-operative associations for the purpose of making commodity
loans to their members, who pay a nominal fee, generally $5.00 or
$10.00, for a lifetime membership. During the 1930's, the Cor-
poration in many cases supplied the funds necessary to establish
such co-operatives. 2 5 Since that time, nonrecourse loans have some-
time been made- to tobacco co-operative associations, for example
- to cover advances made by them to member producers at support
prices. The member producer and the commodity must meet the
same type of eligibility requirements as in the case of loans made
on other commodities by lending agencies or State Agricultural Sta-
bilization and Conservation Committee offices. The actual procedure
has been described as follows:
When eligible tobacco delivered by an individual grower to the
auction warehouse does not receive a purchase offer above the
support price established for the grade and type, the tobacco
is assigned to the association .... Payment of the support price
to the grower is made by the auction warehouse for the account
of the association. The association obtains the funds required
to reimburse the warehouse from a bank acting as fiscal agent
for CCC. The bank, in turn, obtains funds by draft on CCC
payable at a Federal Reserve Bank.
The associations assume control of all tobacco delivered by them,
pledge the tobacco to CCC as collateral for its loan, and arrange
for necessary redrying, packing, storage, etc., and for its sale
upon approval by the Corporation. Upon sale of the tobacco,
the proceeds are apportioned to interest and principal. If a
gain results after all the collateral has been sold and the principal
25. See Commodity Crcdit Corporation Charter, Senate Hearings, January
19, 1948, p. 52. Testimony of N. E. Dodd, the Under Secretary of Agriculture:
"Mr. Dodd: When we had the first peanut and the first tobacco loans in much
of the South there was no marketing set-up that was available to the farmers
where the Government on the one hand could operate directly with the farmer.
"So we encouraged the setting up of cooperatives ... [to takel over the
actual making of the loan .... We had no such organization [county and termi-
nal warehouses] ...in the tobacco and peanut fields. They were unable to
finance themselves through any local agencies to the extent necessary to handle
this great volume of business.
"So Commodity Credit even advanced the money for setting up the organi-
zation itself .... In addition to that, we offer the co-op a payment for every
operation they do.
"They take in this tobacco. We pay them for buying it. We pay them for
packing it and putting it in the hogshead. If they sell it, we pay them for
selling it. It is a charge on Commodity Credit for each of the operations,
rather than having our own facilities to do those things."
[Vol. 7
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and interest have been paid, the gain is distributed by the asso-
ciation to the participating producers or is retained by the asso-
ciation as a reserve. If the amount realized from the sale of
the collateral is not sufficient to pay the loan in full, CCC assumes
the loss. 28
Price-support nonrecourse loans are made exclusively through this
mechanism, which has also been used extensively in supporting the
prices of peanuts and cotton.27 These loans are made to co-opera-
tive associations because the individual producers lack adequate fa-
cilities for preparing the commodity for storage in a condition which
will meet the requirements set by the Commodity Credit Corporation
to protect its investment in the commodity as collateral for a loan.
The Commodity Credit Corporation and other USDA agencies
have also utilized private purchasing agencies in their price-support
operations. Processing firms, corporations, and producer co-opera-
tive associations have been relied upon to extend price-support to
agricultural producers through direct purchase programs. Their use
has been prompted by expediency in some cases, 28 by necessity in
others,2 9 with the private organizations often-times taking the initia-
tive in offering their services, generally at cost, to Departmental
agencies. It cannot be said with any marked degree of assurance
26. Corporation Audits Division, General Accounting Office, Report on the
Audit of the Commodity Credit Corporation, Fiscal Years 1948 and 1949 (Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 105.
27. To Establish a Farm Price Support Program, Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., January 23, 1947
(Washington: 1947), p. 49. For example, "The CCC announced on June 30,
1951, that it would make loans available on the 1950 crop cotton to cooperative
marketing associations through May 15, 1952." See Production and Marketing
Administration and Commodity Credit Corporation, Active and Announced
Price Support Programs Approved by Board of Directors through June 30, 1951
(Washington: Fiscal Branch, PMA, Mimeographed, 1951), p. 1.
28. Long-Range Agricultural Policy, Hearings before the House Committee
on Agriculture, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 4, June 3, 1947 (Washington,
1947), p. 510. For example, see testimony of John Brandt, President, National
Cooperative Milk Producers Federation: "Mr. Brandt: A group of men repre-
senting the National Cooperative Milk Producers Federation, on August 18,
1933, met with the then Secretary of Agriculture and his staff here in Wash-
ington, and we discussed what might be done, in an emergency of this kind, to
stop the further unwarranted decline in the price of butter ....
"We agreed at that time, as members of the Land O'Lakes Creameries, to
handle the surplus . . . until the Department could get its forces organized
to do the job, which they thought would take 10 days' time."
29. General Farm Program, Hearings before the House Committee on Agri-
culture, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Part II Serial P, April 7, 1949 (Washington,
1949), p. 213: "Secretary Brannan: We carnot buy hogs at the farmer's gate
nor, in fact, can we buy them at the stockyards.
"The only practical way to buy hogs is from the packer after slaughtering,
processing, curing, and so on."
1954]
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that private organizations have not accepted official governmental re-
sponsibility in this area of public administration. 30
The first organization called upon was the Land* O'Lakes Creamer-
ies, which, in the late summer of 1933, agreed to stabilize the price
of butter at parity levels by making timely purchases in the open
market with its own funds. John Brandt, President of the National
Co-operative Milk Producers Federation in 1947, testifying at a
Congressional hearing, observed:
How did we do it? We have offices in Philadelphia, Boston,
New York, Chicago, all of your main distributing points. That
night I got in touch with all of our branch managers, and I said,
'Now, fellows, tomorrow morning before the markets open, you
go out on the street [warehouses] and buy butter . ... '
So I said, 'Then, when the Exchange opens, you go up and bid
a cent above yesterday's market, and see what will happen.'
They bought a little butter on the Exchange and before the
Exchange opened, that got around the street ....
So we went on the Exchange, and without buying, but possibly
a carload or two of butter in any one day on the street, created
a sentiment . . . . If nobody else wanted it, we were willing
to take it .... 31
The Agricultural Adjustment Administration later purchased the
butter from the Land O'Lakes organization at the price the latter
had paid for it, plus administrative costs.
8 2
Because of an unusually heavy crop, the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration in 1937 made loans to the Prune Credit Corporation and
the Prune Products Corporation to enable them to purchase, respec-
tively, standard and substandard quality fruit. In this case, pro-
ducers were paid the parity price on some 56,000 tons, with loans
totaling $2,357,000 to both corporations. Subsequent liquidation was
accomplished without loss to the Commodity Credit Corporation. 3
The butter market was again glutted in 1938, the market price
30. Cf. Leiserson, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
31. Long-Range Agricultural Policy and Program, Hearings before the Sen-
ate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I,
October 9, 1947 (Washington, 1947), p. 128.
32. Ibid: "Senator Ellender: How much did it cost the government to oper-
ate through you? Mr. Brandt: To operate through us? It cost them a quarter
of a cent. That is about what we charged in brokerage, plus the actual operat-
ing expense ... which was about three-quarters of a cent per pound ....
We handled only 11,000,000 pounds ... , and we stabilized the market .... "
33. Commodity Credit Corporation, Report of the President of the Commodi-
ty Credit Corporation, 1940, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940),
p. 15.
[Vol. 7
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being considerably below parity. The Land O'Lakes organization
was again urged by USDA officials to stabilize the price of butter
at 85 per cent of parity through purchases in the open market. They
declined to attempt this alone, so a new corporation, the Dairy Pro-
ducts Marketing Association, was organized under Delaware law.
This Corporation was composed of the major dairy marketing co-
operatives, including Land O'Lakes.3 4 The Commodity Credit Cor-
poration lent the new corporation the necessary funds; the Surplus
Marketing Administration, USDA, agreed to repurchase the butter
if necessary at the purchase price, plus operational costs, for relief
distribution through the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation.
Until the spring of 1942 and price control, the Dairy Products
Marketing Association stood ready to purchase all offers of butter,
and made purchases which amounted to about $250,000,000. The
Corporation was able to rather effectively stabilize the market price.
This it did without loss- it actually made a slight profit; the Com-
modity Credit Corporation was also reimbursed in the full amount
of its original loan.3 5
Also, in the fall of 1938, the Pacific Coast Hog Stabilization Cor-
poration received from the Commodity Credit Corporation a $2,-
300,000 loan to make advancements to hog growers, since the 1937
supply was some forty-four million pounds in excess of market
requirements and the prospects for good prices of course were non-
existent.36 Similar loans have been made to producer co-operative
associations to support prices of peanuts and tobacco. 37
Utilization of the services of such private purchasing organizations
declined with the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938
and its provision for individual producer nonrecourse loans on dairy
products. 3
8
However, the major factor which made continued utilization, of
private organizations unnecessary was of course World War II with
its unprecedented demand for all agricultural products accompanied
by prices well above 100 per cent of parity for almost all such com-
modities.
34. Long-Range Agricultural Policy and Program, Senate Hearings, Part I,
October 9, 1947, p. 113.
35. Long-Range Agricultural Policy, House Hearings, Part IV, June 3, 1947,
pp. 512-514.
36. Commodity Credit Corporation, Report of the President of the Comniodi-
ty Credit Corporation, 1940, p. 14.
37. Corporation Audits Division, General Accounting Office, Report on Audit
of the Commodity Credit Corporation, Fiscal Years 1946 and 1947, I (Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 34, 43.
38. Pub. L. No. 430, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., (February 16, 1938).
19541
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III.
The practice of utilizing interest groups in public administration
"may run counter to a legal tradition that all public functions should.
be exercised by public officials,"3 9 but the complexities associated
with administration in a "mixed" capitalistic economy4o seem to ha-
bitually modify tradition, legal and otherwise. In this area ot
governmental activity, the practical aspects of extending price-sup-
port to farmers have required the extensive utilization of private
organizations in the administrative processes. The evidence clearly
indicates that their use has been beneficial to the producers, the
federal government, and the private organizations themselves.
With respect to the major device used to support farm prices-
the nonrecourse commodity loan program- these private agencies
have provided flexible financing at a very nominal cost to both pro-
ducers and the Commodity Credit Corporation. In addition, they
have enabled the government to extend price-support to farmers
without having to incur the added expense necessary to create and
maintain special units for the processing of commodities like cotton
and-tobacco, which is necessary to put them in acceptable condition
as collateral for loans and commodity purchase.4 1 In general, the
cost to the government for these services has been small, yet the
encouragement to the extension of private business has been material.
R. G. Austin, a noted student of agricultural programs, has observed
that "the farmer associations now operating under the CCC are do-
ing a most creditable job, and of themselves, cannot be accused of
excessive cost to the economy . . . ."4 In 1948, Under Secretary of
Agriculture, N. E. Dodd, informed a Congressional Committee that
he knew "of very few losses that have occurred to the Commodity
Credit through any lending agency making errors or absconding with
the capital" 48 lent to it by the Corporation.
The direct utilization of private organizations in the administration
39. Leiserson, op. cit., p. 11.
40. Paul A. Samuelson has observed: "Since some time in the nineteenth
century . . . , there has been a steady increase in the economic functions of
government ... our's is a mixed free-enterprise economic system in which both
public and private institutions exercise economic control." Samuelson, Eco-
NOmICS, AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 34 (1948).
41. Jaffe, loc. cit., p. 212: "Those performing the operation or constituting
a part of the relation to be regulated are likely to have a more urgent sense
of the problem and the possibilities of effective solution: experience and ex-
periment lie immediately at hand."
42. Austin, Government Programs in Tobacco, 32 JOURNAL OF FARM Eco-
Nomics 401 (1950).
43. Commodity Credit Corporation Charter, Senate Hearings, January 19,
1948, p. 58.
[Vol. 7
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol7/iss2/5
SoME NOTES ON FARM PRI(c SUPPORT
of price-support programs has become established fact, and, in this
author's opinion, a justifiable development, which has recognized
the wisdom of direct participation by these groups in the sphere of
their peculiar and common interests. In any attempt to adequately
solve the problem of extended price-support to growers of perishable
commodities, increased reliance upon such private organizations of-
fers, this author believes, potentialities the surface of which has
hardly been scratched.44 It is to be regretted that this promising
line has thus far not been relied upon more extensively.
Avery Leiserson has also wisely observed, that "specific methods
of interest representation . . . are justified only if they can be or-
ganized under conditions which will insure their operation in the
public interest." 45  In the case under study, protection of Congres-
sional intent and the public interest, especially in terms of guarantee-
ing uniform and impartial service to all eligible farmers and freedom
from arbitrary action by such private organizations, is assured.
Any eligible farmer who does not want to join a co-operative asso-
ciation or use local banks can obtain a nonrecourse loan upon his
cotton, tobacco, peanuts, etc., directly from his County or State Agri-
cultural Stabilization and Conservation Committee. In addition, all
private lending agencies risk revocation of their "lending agency
certificate" by the Commodity Credit Corporation in the event in-
vestigation uncovers abuse of farmers in this respect or failure to
observe rigid administrative and fiscal procedures.
Over a decade ago, Louis L. Jaffe concluded that the problem re-
mains unsettled as to whether "public administration shall be the
exclusive mode" 46 of conducting public business. An evaluation of
this case study reveals that the possibility of utilizing private organiza-
tions to conduct public business of a service nature in other areas of
public administration, on a contractual basis, might well be made by
students of public administration. However, as Leiserson has sug-
gested, there is a definite need for the charting of permissible limits
to such utilization and the determination as to whether some guiding
rules can be devised to prevent indiscriminate and improper use.
This requires a pragmatic approach and a consideration of the in-
stitutional factors surrounding each possible extension of private
organizations into public administration.
44. Frischknecht, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
45. Op. cit., p. 11.
46. Loc. cit., p. 212.
1954]
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